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Abstract: The software release game by Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) is reconsidered in
the framework of two person non-zero sum game of timing. More precisely, the noisy type of
software release strategies under two different criteria as well as an alternative silent type of
strategy are derived in the closed forms. Our method employed in this paper has an advantage
over Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) since it is simpler and much tractable on computation
of the silent strategy. Also, the method can be extended directly to obtain the noisy type of
strategies.
$0$ . Introduction
Software $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}_{J}\mathrm{y}$ is one of the most important issues for realization of a highly reliable
computer system. As conventional methods for estimating and predicting the $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}1_{1}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ of
a developed software product, a large number of software reliability growth models based on
probability $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ statistical theory have been proposed in the literature, and at] the sarne time,
have been recognized to be useful for assessing the software reliability quantitatively (see Musa,
Iannino and Okumoto (1987), Xie (1991) and Lyu (1996) $)$ . These software reliability growth
models have several advantages to support a decision making in the development management
of software products. During the software testing phase a software system will be executed with
a sampling of some test cases in order to $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}/\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ software faults which cause software
failures. A software failure is defined as an unacceptable output of program operation caused by
a software f.ault remaining in the system. Ordinarily, we can assume in the software reliability
growth lnodels that the correction of faults does not introduce any new fault. Though the
software test has to be executed sufficiently to deliver a reliable software system to the market
or the user, it should be noted that the longer $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}.\mathrm{e}$ test causes the increasing software cost.
Of course, if many llumber of software faults are remained in the software system after being
released. $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ software $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\backslash r\mathrm{e}1_{0}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ will suffer seriollsly financial damages to
$\mathrm{c}o\mathrm{r}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{C}:\mathrm{t}$ them in the
operation phase. Thus. it is of great importance $\mathrm{t}_{J}\mathrm{o}$ determine the economi(, filning to
$1^{\cdot}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}$ the
$;,\cdot \mathrm{t})\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}_{\tau}\tau \mathrm{t}^{r}.\mathrm{e}‘ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}1)\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}(\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{t}$. $\mathrm{S}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\cdot \mathrm{h}$ a problenl is called the $soft_{\text{ }}7I\prime are\gamma\cdot el^{2}\{,ase\tau J\gamma\cdot obl_{G\gamma}r\prime J\mathrm{a}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{d}$ has beerl $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}_{\backslash }^{\backslash }‘,\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$
bv rnany autllors.
The software release $1^{)\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{b}1()\iota 11$ was first ( $.(\mathrm{n}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{i}(\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}s\Gamma \mathrm{C}(1$ bv Okunloto and Goel (1980).
$\mathrm{A}‘ \mathrm{s}^{\tau},\mathrm{S}$uming
the so-called exponelltial software reliabilitv growtll model $1\gamma \mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}’()\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}$. $011$ a 11on-homog
$(^{1}\iota 1\zeta 1(\iota 1:\backslash$, Poisson
$1^{)\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}}\square ^{\backslash }‘,$ , they $\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}}.\mathrm{U}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ the total $\mathrm{e}x\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}:\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ software cost and $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}1\tau^{\tau}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ tlle $\mathrm{o}_{1^{\mathrm{J}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\ln}}}\mathrm{a}1.\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\backslash \cdot \mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{l}$relcasc
time $\mathrm{t}_{}\mathrm{o}$ minimizc if. Koch and Kubat (1983), Yamacla and Osaki (1985. 1987) and Ohtera
and Yamada (1990) analyzed the similar problems under several kinds of software reliability
growth lnodels $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ cost criteria. The other approaches were developed by Forman and
Singpurwalla $(1977, 1979)$ , $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}$ and Ackerman (1989) and Ross (1985), though they never aim
to get the cost-oriented software release schedules. Latter, the software release problems from
the economical point of view were generalized by Dalal and Mallows $(1988, 1990, 1992\mathrm{a}, 1992\mathrm{b})$ .
They reforrnulated the underlying problem as an optimal stopping problem. Ill this way, most
existing software release problems have been concentrated their attention to direct minimization
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of the total expected software cost, but have not been considered about a competitive market
situation in which one can observe in real world. Abdel-Ghaly, Chan and Littlewood (1986)
proposed evaluation methods of competing software reliability predictions and applied statistical
plotting methods to compare two different software reliability growth models.
Recently, Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) and Zeephongsekul (1996) analyzed the software
release problems under competitive market circumstance in the frame work of two person non-
zero sum games and provided more realistic and sophisticated software release schedules. More
specifically, Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) dealt with the software release problem as a typical
but somewhat different two-person game of timing from classical ones by Fox and Kimeldorf
(1969), Teraoka $(1976, 1979, 1983\mathrm{a}, 1983\mathrm{b})$ , Sakaguchi (1978) and Kurisu $(1983, 1989)$ . In this
paper, we call such a game-theoretic software release problem the software release game. It will
be important to discuss the software release game in details, since the existing software release
problems treat the optimization ones for only one software developer and are self-concluded
problems. In other words, while most earlier papers never take the real market fluctuation into
account, the factor of marketing seems to be indispensable to the evaluation. From this reason,
the seminal works by Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) and Zeephongsekul (1996) should be
encouraged and will give an impact to the software development management. Unfortunately,
notice that their approach is quite complex and involves some computational complexity, as
described latter. The main purpose of this paper is to reconsider the software release game by
Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995). More precisely, the noisy type of software release strategies
under two different criteria as well as an alternative silent type of strategy are derived in the
closed forms. Our method employed in this paper has an advantage over Zeephongsekul and
Chiera (1995) since it is simpler and much tractable on computation of the silent strategy. Also,
the method can be extended directly to obtain the noisy type of strategies. In the rest part of
this section, we introduce the most basic software release problem by Okumoto and Goel (1980)
and prepare to derive the game-theoretic strategies in sequential sections.
Suppose that there exist only two software developers in the market and that they share it.
For convenience, they are labeled as Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Let $\{N_{i}(t))0\leq t\leq$
$T_{LC},$ $i=1,2\}$ be the stochastic point processes representing the number of faults experienced in
a software program up to time $t$ in the testing phase, where $T_{LC}(>0)$ denotes the software life
cycle and is a pre-determined constant. Without any loss of generality, we assume that $N_{i}(t)$ is
increasing in $t$ with $N_{i}(0).=0,$ $i=1,2$ . As Chen and Singpurwalla (1997) and Al-Mutairi, Chen
and Singpurwalla (1998) pointed out, it should be noted that almost software reliability growth
models proposed in the literature are belonging to a sub-family of poillt processes. Define the
following notation;
$p_{i}$ : the unit price of the software product developed by Player $i(=1,2)$
Ci $(t)$ : the total expected software cost for Player $i$ when the software is released at time $t$
$c_{1i}$ : the testing cost per unit tinle incurred in testing phase to Player $i$ ,
$c_{2i}$ : the cost to remove a fault in testing phase to Player $i$ ,
($j3i$ : the cost to relnove a faulf $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}_{\mathrm{I}}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{z}}‘ \mathrm{I}^{\cdot}\mathrm{a}\dagger \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$phase to Plaver $i$ , where $\mathrm{r}_{3j}>c_{2i}$ .
If Player 1 wishes to maximize his or her own total expected profit $g_{1}(f)=p_{1}.4_{1}(t)-C_{1}(t)$ .
where $C_{1}(t)=c_{11}f+\Gamma_{21}\mathrm{E}[N](t)]+C.31\{\mathrm{E}[N_{1}(\tau_{LC})]-\mathrm{E}[N_{1}(f)]\}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}1.q_{1}(f)$ is differentiable with
respect to $t$ . then the problem is reduced to a simple algebraic one to obtain $\tau_{1}$ . where $\tau_{i}\in$
$[0, T_{L\zeta}j]\equiv\{t\geq 0|\llcorner \mathrm{s}^{\alpha}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}g_{i}(t).i=1.2\}$ and the success ill selling the $\mathrm{I}$) $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}(1_{1}\mathrm{J}_{\wedge}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{t}$ released at arbitrary
time $t(\geq 0)$ is achieved with probability $A_{i}(t)$ . If each player does not take account of his or her
opponent as the classical software release problem, it means that $A_{i}(t)=0$ and $\tau_{i}=\gamma_{i}\equiv\{t\geq$
$0|$ inf Ci $(t),$ $i=1.2\}$ . Hence if tlle function $\mathrm{E}[N_{i}(t)]$ is strictly concave in $t$ , then $d^{2}g_{i}(t)/dt^{2}<0$
under $c_{3i}>c_{2i}$ and there exists unique optimal software release time $\gamma_{i}$ under the conditions
that $c_{1i}/(c_{3i}-c_{2i})< \lim_{tarrow 0}(d\mathrm{E}[N_{i}(t)]/dt)$ and $c_{1i}/(c_{3i}-c_{2i})>$ lirn$tarrow T_{LC}(d\mathrm{E}[Ni(t)]/dt)$ . To
avoid trivial cases ( $i.e$ . $\gamma_{i}=0$ and $\gamma_{i}=T_{LC}$ ), we assume that there exists unique $\gamma_{i}\in(0, T_{L}c)$ ,
where $\lim_{tarrow\gamma_{\mathrm{i}}}(d\mathrm{E}[Ni(t)]/dt)=c_{1i}/(C_{3i^{-C_{2i}}}),$ $i=1,2$ . Of course, note that the strategy above
does not take account of the effect of opponent’s action in competitive environment.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the software release game by
Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995), which is a silent type game of timing $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}$ . infinite games on the
square, and point out the problems. In Section 2, a different strategy for the software release
game is derived and the problems in Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) are overcame. Then,
the concept of Nash equilibrium (1951) is useful to calculate a mixed equilibrium strategy for
competitive two rival software developers. In Section 3, two noisy type of games are considered
and the optimal strategies are characterized.
1. The software release game
We formulate a software release game in a fashion similar to Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995).
The software products produced by two rival players are assumed to perform virtually the same
set of tasks and have the same (and constant) software life cycle $T_{LC}(>0)$ . If the market
is not competitive, they will release their softwares at the best timing which minimize the
expected total software costs incurred and estimated during both the testing and operation
phases, respectively. However, since the market is competitive in practice, both players will
be influenced by his or her opponent and the release plans based on only their own criteria
are not always adequate from the game-theoretic points of view. We suppose that Player 1
(2) has to decide to release the software product at time $t=x(y)$ and that success in selling
the product released at arbitrary time $t(\geq 0)$ is achieved with probability $A_{1(t)(A(}2t$)), where
the functions $A_{i}(t)$ are known each other from past experiences, unimodal in $t$ with $A_{i}(\mathrm{O})=$
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s},\eta?$
.
$\in[\mathrm{A}_{i}(TLC)=0,i1, 20, \tau_{LC}^{=}]\equiv’\{t\geq 0|\sup(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}_{A_{i}}\mathrm{W}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}t), i=\mathrm{l},2\}.\square \mathrm{r}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}A(t)\mathrm{i}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}t,\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{g}_{i}1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}1\max_{\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}’}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\eta_{i}\mathrm{e}$
software released at both earlier and latter stages has a smaller success probability in the market
since it involves a larger number of faults at earlier phase and the success probability should
become smaller in latter phase. This point is quite different from existing games of timing (Fox
and Kimeldorf (1969), Teraoka $(1976, 1979, 1983\mathrm{a}, 1983\mathrm{b})$ , Sakaguchi (1978) and Kurisu (1983,
1989)). For these technical assumptions, see Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995).
Let (X, $Y$ ) $=[0, T_{L}c]\cross[0, T_{L}c]$ denotes the sets of pure strategies for Player 1 and 2, re-
spectively, and $(x, y)\in(X, Y)$ the pure strategies representing the release times for respec-
tive software products. Since the solution for two person non-zero sum game of timing is
a randomized one, we adopt the mixed strategies $F_{1}=F_{1}(x)=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\{X\leq x\}\in[0,1]$ and
$F_{2}=F_{2()}y=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\{Y\leq y\}\in[0,1]$ (see Nash (1951) and Fox and Kimeldorf (1969)). This means
that Player $i$ release the software products at random times characterized by probability distri-
bution functions $F_{i},$ $i=1,2$ . More specifically, if Player $i$ take the mixed strategies $F_{i}$ , then their
total expected software rewards can be represented as $M_{i}(F_{1}, F_{2}),$ $i=1,2$ . Zeephongsekul and
Chiera (1995) formulated the total expected software rewards for respective players as follows.
it$I_{1}(x, y)=\{$ $p_{1_{\frac{A}{A}}1}p_{1}2(y(x).-^{c_{1}(})4_{1(_{X}})x)-^{c_{1(X}})$
$(0\leq x<y\leq\tau Lc)$






$(0\leq x\leq y\leq\tau_{Lc})$ .
where, in general, $\overline{A4}(\cdot)=1-A(\cdot)$ .
Remark 1.1: It should be noted that the two-person non-zero sum game formulated above is a
silent game, though Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) say that it is a noisy game. That is, each
player can not know the oppo.nent’s action.
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Define
$M_{i}(F_{1}, F_{2})= \int_{X}\int_{Y}M_{i}(x, y)dF1dF2$ , $i=1,2$ , (3)
where
$M_{1}(x, F2)= \int_{Y}M_{1(_{X},y})dF_{2}$ (4)
and
$M_{2}(F_{1,y)=} \int_{X}M_{2}(x, y)dF_{1}.$ (5)
Then the problem is to derive the mixed equilibrium strategies (or Nash strategies) $(F_{1’ 2^{*}}^{*}F)$ or
their densities $(\partial F_{1}^{*}(X)/\partial x, \partial F_{2^{*}}(y)/\partial y)=(f_{1}^{*}, f_{2^{*}})$ , if exists, satisfying
$M_{1}(F_{1^{*}}, F_{2^{*}})\geq M_{1}(F_{1}, F_{2}^{*})$ (6)
and
$M_{2}(F_{1}^{*}, F_{2}*)\geq M_{2}(F_{1}*, F_{2})$ , (7)
where $M_{i}(F_{1}*, F_{2}^{*}),$ $i=1,2$ , is called the game value or simply value function.
The following lemma which was obtained by Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) is needed to
complete the discussion throughout this paper.
Lemma 1.2: $\eta_{i}\wedge\gamma_{i}\leq\tau_{i}\leq\eta_{i}\gamma_{i}$ .
Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) derived the mixed equilibrium strategies satisfying Eqs. (6)
and (7). We give the following result without proof.
Proposition 1.3: The mixed equilibrium strategies by Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995)
$F_{i}^{*}(t)=\{$
$0$ , $0\leq t<\rho \mathrm{s}-i$
$\int_{\beta 3-\mathfrak{i}}^{t}fi(y)dy$ , $\rho_{3-i}\leq t\leq\sigma_{3-i}$
1, $\sigma_{3-i}<t\leq T_{LC}$
(8)
satisfy the inequalities in $Eqs(\mathit{6})$ and (7), where $p_{i},$ $i=1,2$ , is the unique root of
$\int_{\rho_{i}}^{\sigma_{i}}f_{3-\mathrm{i}(y}1dy=1$ (9)
and where
$f_{i}(t)= \frac{\{C_{3-i}(t)+g3-i(\rho 3-i)\}(\partial d4_{3i}-(t)/\partial t)-(\partial c_{3-i}(t)/\partial t)\wedge 43-i(t)}{p_{3-i}\wedge 4_{i}(t)\{.43-i(t)\}^{2}}$ , (10)
and $\sigma_{i}=\sup\{t:f_{3-}i(t)>0\}$ .
Remark 1.4: Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995) proposed the above mixed equilibrillm strategies
in the silent game setting. However, it should be noted that their strategies have some conl-
putational complexity. For instance, in order to derive $f_{3-i}(t)$ , one has to set an initial value
for $\rho_{3-i}$ and calculate $t=\sigma_{i}$ so as to satisfy $\sup\{t : f_{3-i}(t)>0\}$ . Since the value of $\sigma_{i}$ does
not always satisfy $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{q}.(9)$ , one must calculate the next candidate of $\rho_{i}$ for the fixed $\sigma_{i}$ . Then
the same procedure is repeated until both conditions $\int_{\rho_{\mathrm{i}}}^{\sigma_{i}}f3-i(y)dy\approx 1$ and $f\mathrm{s}-i(\sigma_{i})\approx 0$ are
satisfied. However, such a iteration method does not always guarantee the uniqueness of the
solution, and in fact is not feasible for some parameter setting.
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2. An alternative silent strategy
In this section, we consider a different silent type of game from Zeephongsekul and Chiera
(1995) and give an alternative mixed equilibrium strategy. Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995)
construct $F_{i^{*}}(t)$ with $p_{i}$ satisfying the normal condition $\int_{\rho_{\mathrm{i}}}^{\sigma_{i}}f3-i(y)dy=1$ for a fixed $\sigma_{1}$ , but we
determine the parameter $a$ so as to satisfy $\int_{a}^{\eta}fi(y)dy=1$ with $\eta=\min(\eta_{1}, \eta_{2})$ . In that sense,
our stopping rule is expected to be quite different from $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{q}.(8)$ and much simple for calculation.
The necessary condition to exist the optimal software release strategy is to exist the solution
of the first-order condition of optimality;
$\frac{\partial}{\partial x}M_{1}(x, F_{2})=0$ (11)
for Player 1. On the other hand, the sufficient condition is to show the existence of the game
value $M_{i}(F_{1}^{*}, F)2^{*}’ i=1,2$ , satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7). In the first part of this section, let
us consider the necessary condition. Solving the differential equation above, the first-order
condition of optimality for mixed equilibrium strategies $f_{i}(x)$ can be derived as follows.
Lemma 2.1: The solutions of the differential equations in Eq. (11) are
$f_{i}(t)=\{$
$0$ , $(0\leq t<a)$ ,
$\frac{(\partial A_{3-i}(t)/\partial t)\{C_{3-i}(t)+g_{3-}i(a)\}-(\partial C3-i(t)/\partial t)A3-i(\mathit{0})}{p_{3-i}\mathrm{t}A3-i(t)\}2A_{i(t)}}$ , $(a\leq t\leq\eta)$ ,
(12)
where $a_{\mathrm{i}},$ $i=1,2$ , satisfies $\int_{a}^{\eta_{\mathrm{i}}}f_{i(}x$ ) $d_{X}=1,$ $a= \max(a1, O2)$ and $\eta=\min(\eta 1, \eta_{2})$ .
Lemma 2.2: $0<a<\eta\leq\tau_{i},$ $i=1,2$ , if $f_{i}(x)\geq 0$ for $a\leq x\leq\eta$ .
Lemma 2.3: There exists unique a $(>0)$ such that
$\int_{a}^{\eta}fi(t)dt\geq 1$ , $i=1,2$ . (13)
Now, we are in the position to derive the mixed equilibrium strategies. Since the following
theorem is due to Teraoka $(1979, 1983\mathrm{a},\mathrm{b})$ , the proof is omitted for brevity.




where $I(z)=1$ at $z=\eta$ ) otherwise, $I(z)=0$ , and the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are
$\alpha 0$ , $\beta 0$ , $a=$ , (16)
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$\alpha=1-\int_{a}^{\eta}f_{1}(x)d_{X}$ , $\beta=1-[_{a}^{\eta}f2(y)dy$ . (17)
Theorem 2.5: The values of software release game are
$M_{i}(F_{1’ 2^{*}}^{*}F)=g_{i}(a)$ , $i=1,2$ (18)
and the optimal mixed equilibrium strategie8 are given by $F_{i}^{*}(t)$ in $Eqs.(\mathit{1}\mathit{4})$ and (15).
Remark 2.6: Note that Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 correspond to necessary and sufficient conditions,
respectively, for the mixed equilibrium strategies. From Theorem 2.4, in particular, our strate-
gies involve only one unknown parameter $a$ and overcome the incompleteness of computational
procedure in Zeephongsekul and Chiera (1995). Further, this motivates that the noisy type of
game should be considered in the following section.
3. Noisy games
(3.1) Noisy Game $A$
The first part of this section concerns the noisy version of the previous section. That is.
two players can observe opponent’s action each other and can release the software products
at the best timing if the opponent has already released and failed in the market, where $‘(\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$
best timing” means the time instant when their total expected software rewards are maximized.
Then, we have
$M_{1}(x, y)=\{$ $\frac{p_{1}}{\mathrm{A}}2(y)\max\{p1A1(x)-C1(x)\}A_{1}(X)-C_{1}(_{X})$





$(0\leq x\leq y\leq\tau_{Lc})$ .
$(0\leq y<X\leq\tau_{L}c)$
(20)
To derive the mixed equilibrium strategies satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7), we obtain the first-order
conditions of optimality which satisfy $\partial M_{1}(x, F_{2})/\partial x=0$ and $\partial M_{2}(F_{1}, y)/\partial y=0$ as follows.




$k_{\dot{3}-}^{1}. \exp i\{\int.D_{\dot{3}-i(}^{1\}}t)\mathrm{r}lt$ $((\tau\leq t\leq\tau)$ . (21)
$wher\mathrm{f}_{)}\supset,.f\mathrm{o}ri=1,2$ ,
$D_{i}^{A}(t)= \frac{1-(\partial B_{i}A(t\mathrm{I}/\zeta^{t}Jt)}{B_{i}^{A}(t)}$ , (22)
$B_{l}^{A}(t)= \frac{\mathit{9}i(\tau 1-A3-i(t)gi(\tau 1-gi(t)}{(\partial g_{i}(t)/\partial t)}$ (23)
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and
$k_{i}^{A}= \frac{\lim_{tarrow a}(\partial g_{i}(t)/\partial t)}{g_{i}(\tau)-A_{3}-l(a)gi(_{T})-g_{i}(a)}\exp\{-\int D_{i}^{A}(a)da\}$. (24)
and where $a_{i},$ $i=1,2$ , satisfies $\int_{a_{i}}^{\mathcal{T}}fi(t)dt=1$ with $a= \max(a_{1}, a_{2})$ and $\tau=\min(\tau_{1}, \mathcal{T}2)$ .
Lemma 3.2: $0<a<\tau$ and $g_{i}(a)\geq\overline{A}_{3-i}(a)gi(T),$ $i=1,2$ .
Lemma 3.3: Define $Q_{i}^{A}(t) \equiv\exp\{\int D_{i}A(t)dt\},$ $i=1,2$ . If $\{1+\overline{A}_{i}(a)\}g_{i}(\mathcal{T})/2\geq(<)g_{i}(a)$ and
the function $Q_{i}^{A}(t)$ increases (strictly decreases) in $t$ , then
$\int_{a_{3-\mathrm{z}}}^{\tau}f3-i(t)dt\geq(<)1$ . (25)
Theorem 3.4: (i) If $\{1+\overline{A}_{\mathrm{i}}(a)\}gi(\tau)/2\geq g_{i}(a)$ and $Q_{i}^{A}(t)$ increases in $t$ , then
$F_{1}^{*}(X)=\{$
$0$ $(0\leq x<a)$





$\int_{a}^{\tau}f2(y)dy+\beta I(Z)$ $(a\leq y\leq\tau)$
(27)
where $I(z)=1$ at $z=\tau$ , otherwise, $I(z)=0$ , the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ satisfy Eq. (16) and
$\alpha=1-\int_{a}^{\mathcal{T}}f1(x)d_{X}$ , $\beta=1-\int_{a}^{\tau}f2(y)dy$ . (28)
(ii) If $\{1+\overline{A}_{i}(a. )\}gi(\mathcal{T})/2<g_{i}(a)$ and $Q_{i}^{A}(t)$ strictly decreases in $t$ , then the mixed equilibrium
strategies are given by $Eqs.(\mathit{2}\theta)$ and (27), where $\alpha>0$ and $\beta>0$ .
Theorem 3.5: Suppose that either condition (i) or (ii) of Theorem 3.4 is satisfied. The values
of software release game are
$\Lambda I_{i}(F_{1}^{*}, F^{*})2=g_{i}(a)$ . $i=1_{\mathrm{t}}2$ . (29)
$(S.\mathit{2})$ Noisy Game $B$
Next, we consider the different noisy type of software release game. Suppose that two players
can observe opponent’s action each other and wish to release the software products at the timing
when their success probabilities in the market are maximized. Of course, this problem is quite
different from the noisy game A. Consider the following total expected software reward:









$p_{2}A_{2(y})-c_{2}(y)$ $(0\leq y<X\leq T_{L}c)$
$\overline{A}_{1}(x)\{p_{2}\max A2(y)\}-C2(y)$ $(0\leq x\leq y\leq T_{LC})$ . (31)
Lemma 3.6: The solutions of the differential equations $\partial M_{1}(x, F_{2})/\partial x=0$ and $\partial M_{2}(p_{1,y})/\partial y=$
$0$ for $Eqs$ . (30) and (31) are
$f_{l}(t)=\{$
$0$ $(0\leq t<a)$
$k_{3-i}^{B} \exp\{\int D_{3-i}^{B}(t)dt\}$ $(a\leq t\leq\eta)$
(32)
where
$D_{i}^{B}(t)= \frac{1-(\partial B_{i}^{B}(t)/\partial t)}{B_{i}^{B}(t)}$ , (3‘3)
$B_{i}^{B}(t)= \frac{gi(\eta)-A_{3}-i(t)\mathit{9}i(\eta)-gi(x)}{(\partial g_{i}(t,)/\partial t)}$ , {34)
$k_{i}^{B}= \frac{\lim_{tarrow a}(\partial g_{i}(t)/\partial t)}{g_{i}(\eta)-A_{3}-i(a)g_{i}(\eta)-g_{i}(a)}\exp\{-\int D_{i}^{B}(a)da\}$ $(3_{\iota}^{\mathfrak{x}_{\}}’})$
and, where $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ are the unique root of
$\int_{a_{\dot{\mathrm{t}}}}^{\eta}f_{i}(t)dt=1$ , $i=1,2$ , (36)
$a= \max(a_{1}, a_{2})$ and $\eta=\min(\eta_{1}, \eta_{2})$ .
Lemma 3.7: $0<a<\eta$ and $g_{i}(a)>\overline{A}_{3-i}(a)g_{i(}\eta),$ $i=1,2$ .
Lemma 3.8: Define $Q_{i}^{B}(t) \equiv\exp\{\int D_{i}^{B}(t)dt\},$ $i=1,2$ . If $\{1+\overline{A}_{i}(a)\}gi(\eta)/2\geq(<)g_{i}(a)$ and
the function $Q_{i}(t)$ increases (strictly decrease8) in $t$ , then
$\int_{a_{3-}}^{\eta}jdf_{3i}-(X)x\geq(<)1$ . (37)
Theorem 3.9: $(7_{})I\mathit{4}^{\cdot}\{1+\overline{\wedge 4}_{i}(a)\}g_{\uparrow}(\eta)/2\geq g_{i}(a)a7|_{e}d$ Qjri $(t)$ increases in $f,$ , then
$F_{1}^{*}(x)=\{$
$0$ $(0\leq x<a)$




$\int_{a}^{\eta}f_{2}(y)dy+\beta I(z)$ $(a\leq y\leq\eta)$ ,
(39)
38
where $I(z)=1$ at $z=\eta$ , otherwise, $I(z)=0$, the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ satisfy Eq. (16) and
$\alpha=1-\int_{a}^{\eta}f_{1}(x)dx$ , $\beta=1-\int_{a}^{\eta}f_{2}(y)dy$ . (40)
(ii) If $\{. 1+\overline{A}_{i}(a)\}g_{i()/2}\eta<g_{i}(a)$ and $Q_{i}^{B}(t)$ strictly decreases in $t$ , then the mixed equilibrium
strategies are given by $Eqs.(\mathit{3}\mathit{8})$ and (39), where $\alpha>0$ and $\beta>0$ .
Theorem 3.10: Suppose that either condition (i) or (ii) of Theorem 3. 9 is satisfied. The values
of software release game are
$M_{i}(p_{1’ 2^{*}}^{*}F)=gi(a)$ , $i=1,2$ . (41)
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